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Thank you very much. Our final speaker is Susanna Fischer. She is a
professor at Catholic University. She previously served as a law lecturer at the
London Guildhall University. She teaches and researches in the areas of
cyberlaw, comparative law, and intellectual property law. She practiced in




Good afternoon, everyone! I am honored to wrap up this session on such
interesting and cutting-edge legal issues. I will focus today on recent global
legislative initiatives designed to establish a legal framework supporting
electronic signatures. As many governments worldwide increasingly seek to
encourage the growth of e-commerce, the enactment of such legislation has
become a priority. Proponents of electronic signature legislation undoubtedly
share the views of one of the sponsors of the recent United States E-Sign
. Susanna Frederick Fischer is an assistant professor of law at the Columbus School of
Law of The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. Professor Fischer can be
contacted at fischer@law.edu.
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legislation,' former Senator Spencer Abraham, who has opined that electronic
signature legislation "literally suppl[ies] the pavement for the e-commerce lane
of the information superhighway."
'2
The year 2000 was a banner year for electronic signature legislation
worldwide. More countries enacted electronic signature legislation in 2000
than had done so in the previous five years (the first five years of such
legislation). 3  I am going to take a comparative look at this legislation.
Because e-commerce is so inherently global, I think that a comparative
approach is particularly important.
The most striking feature of the various electronic signature laws enacted to
date around the world is their lack of uniformity of approach. This is
interesting in that every jurisdiction enacting such laws shares the same
fundamental goal as E-Sign: to encourage the development of e-commerce by
affording at least some electronic signatures an equivalent legal status to
handwritten pen and ink signatures.4 However, there is a lack of consensus as
to how best to achieve this goal. As a result, we have what Dutch
commentator Simone van der Hof has termed "a veritable Tower of Babel."
'5
Here is an overview of what I am going to say about this Tower of Babel
situation. There are three primary legislative models for the regulation of
electronic signatures. The first model is known as the "mandatory" or "pre-
scriptive" approach, because it mandates one particular technology, namely
digital signatures based on public key cryptography. The second model is the
complete opposite: it is a minimalist approach that is completely technology-
neutral. The third model is a hybrid of the first two. This hybrid model is
expressed to be technology-neutral, but gives certain technologies the benefit
of helpful legal presumptions.
These three models reveal a fundamental philosophical difference in
approach as to the appropriate role of government in establishing security and
trust in electronic signatures. I will suggest that this Tower of Babel situation
is less than ideal for fostering e-commerce, especially when combined with a
dearth of technological standards for electronic signatures. Policymakers need
to remove their national blinders. I will argue that their failure to do so is
likely to result in barriers to global e-commerce as well as a widening digital
I See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000, 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 7001 (Supp. 2001).
2 146 CONG. REC. S5223 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
3 See generally SIMONE VAN DER HOF, DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW SURVEY, available at
<http:/rechten.kub.nllsimone/ds-lawsu.htm>.
4 See generally id. See also David M. Nadler & Valerie M. Furman, Landmark Elec-
tronic Signatures Legislation Becomes Effective, COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. LIT. REP.,
Jan. 3, 2001, at 13, available at LEXIS, 2dary Library, Combined Legal Newsletters File.
5 See B.P. Aalberts & S. van der Hof, Digital Signature Blindness: Analysis of Legis-
lative Approaches Toward Electronic Authentication § 1.2, 7 THE EDI LAW REVIEW 1-55
(2000), available at <http:/rechten.kub.nllsimone/ds-fr.htm>.
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divide.
Before examining the three legislative models in greater detail, I will sketch
out a little essential background, both as to the legal functions of electronic
signatures and as to electronic signature technology.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Legal Functions of Electronic Signatures
Electronic signatures must serve the same essential functions as handwritten
signatures, namely (i) authentication; (ii) integrity; and (iii) non-repudiation.
6
Authentication means ensuring that a party to a transaction is who she purports
to be.7 Integrity means ensuring that a communication has not been altered in
the course of transmission. 8 And finally, non-repudiation means ensuring that
a party cannot later go back on the transaction should a dispute arise. 9
One of the most famous illustrations of a signature that failed in these
essential purposes can be found in William Shakespeare's Hamlet.'0 Towards
the end of the play, in Act V, Scene II, Hamlet delivers this confession:
I had my father's signet in my purse,
Which was the model of that Danish seal;
Folded the writ up in form of th'other,
Subscribed it, gave 't impression, plac'd it safely,
The changeling never known.II
Hamlet is describing one of the most famous forgeries in English literature.
Hamlet's evil uncle, Claudius, the King of Denmark, has exiled Hamlet to
England, accompanied by two messengers, Rosencrantz and Guildenstem, who
are unfaithful friends to Hamlet.12 These messengers bear a letter from
Claudius, sealed with the royal seal, demanding that Hamlet be executed on his
" See David Taylor & Felix A. Ortiz, Encryption-Hindering the Hackers: Some
Technical and Legal Issues, in FouRTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INST. 2000, at 743, 746 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Handbook Series No. GO-00D6, 2000).
7 See Thomas J. Smedinghoff & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving with Change: Electronic
Signature Legislation as a Vehicle for Advancing E-Commerce, 17 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER& INFo. L. 723, 745 (1999).
1 See John F. Delaney & M. Lorrane Ford, The Law of the Internet: A Summary of US
Internet Caselaw and Legal Developments, in REPRESENTING THE NEW MEDIA COMPANY, at
31, 290 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Handbook Series No. GO-
OOJH, 2001).
I' See Smedinghoff & Bro, supra note 7, at 746.
10 See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET; see also Bill Zoellick, Wide Use of
Electronic Signatures Awaits Market Decisions About Their Risks and Benefits, N.Y.STATE
BAR ASS'N J., Nov/Dec. 2000, at 10, 12, 14, available at <http:llwww.nysba.orgl
media/barjoumal/novOO/zoellick.html>.
I SHAKESPEARE, supra note 10, act 5, sc. 2.
12 See id. act. 4, se. 3.
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arrival in England. 13 The crafty Hamlet replaces this letter with a forged letter,
which he seals with a likeness of Claudius' seal. 14 The forged letter orders that
the messengers be killed. 15 Hamlet's forgery is not detected, and Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern unknowingly deliver their own death sentences.
16
Poetic justice for Hamlet's false friends? Some literary critics may think
so,17 but most ethical lawyers and business people will find this successful
forgery disturbing. The seal (or signature) failed to serve at least two of its
essential purposes: (i) authentication (that is, ensuring that the letter was really
sent by its purported sender, Claudius); and (ii) integrity (that is, that the letter
sent by Claudius was not changed in the course of delivery). The play does not
deal with the issue of non-repudiation, but it seems quite clear that Claudius
would not be willing to accept responsibility for the forged order that resulted
in the deaths of Rosencrantz and Guildenstem.
Forged signatures were nothing new in Shakespeare's day. The Old
Testament describes the notorious Jezebel writing letters in her husband
Ahab's name and sealing them with his seal. 18 Unlike Hamlet, Jezebel did not
do this to betray her husband, but rather to ensure an illicit gain of a vineyard. 9
Sadly, human nature does not appear to have improved significantly over time,
and the problem of forged signatures and broken promises persist, even in this
bright new era of e-commerce and technological change.
B. Electronic Signature Technology
We have moved from the seals and signet rings of Hamlet and Jezebel to the
widespread use of handwritten signatures. More recently, new electronic
signature technologies have been developing.
The first major electronic signature technology, generally known as "digital
signatures," is based on advances in cryptography in the mid-1970s,
specifically the birth of public key cryptography. 20 Public key cryptography is
based on the revolutionary notion of two separate keys, one to encrypt a
message and one to decrypt it.21 One key, the public key, is made generally




17 See, e.g., Lois Simpson, A Study of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern from Shakespeare's
Hamlet, Dec. 13, 1999, available at <http://www.hamlet.org/lsimpson.html>.
18 See 1 Kings 21:8.
19 See I Kings 21:7, 14-15.
20 See Taylor & Ortiz, supra note 6 at 747-48. See also W. Diffie, The First Ten Years of
Public-Key Cryptograpy, 78 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 560-77 (1988) (providing an
excellent history of the development of public key cryptography by its discoverer).
21 See RSA LABORATORIES, RSA LABORATORIES' FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT TODAY'S CRYPTOGRAPHY, VERSION 4.1 § 2-1-1 (2000), available at
<http:llwww.rsasecurity.comlrsalabs/faq/2-1-1.html>.
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available, while the other key, the private key, is kept secret by its holder.
22
The two keys are mathematically related so that a message encrypted with one
key can only be decrypted with the other key.23 It is statistically impossible,
even for a computer, to deduce the identity of the private key from the public
key.2
4
If King Claudius had public key encryption at his disposal, and he wanted to
send a message to the English Queen instructing her to kill Hamlet on his
arrival in England, Claudius would encrypt his message with the English
Queen's public key. The message could thus only be decrypted with the
English Queen's private key. Even if Hamlet had access to the Queen's public
key, Hamlet could not read Claudius' message, and Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern would have been saved.
Digital signatures use a public key infrastructure ("PKI"), in a slightly
different way. They also rely on another mathematical algorithm known as a
"hash function. ' 25 This compresses a message into a more concise version,
known as the "message digest. '26 If the underlying message is changed at all,
the message digest would change too.27
To create a digital signature for Claudius' letter to the English Queen,
Claudius would first create a message digest of his letter. Claudius then
encrypts the message digest with his private key-a reversal of the plain
vanilla encryption scenario previously discussed. Claudius next sends both the
encrypted message digest and the message to the English Queen. The English
Queen then uses Claudius' public key to decrypt the message digest. If
successful, the Queen knows that the letter was sent by Claudius, as the holder
of his private key. The Queen then uses the same hash function used by
Claudius to create a message digest of the letter she received from Claudius.
She compares the two message digests. If there are differences, she should
beware! Differences indicate that Claudius' letter was changed in the course
of delivery.
28
One problem: how does the Queen know that Claudius really holds the
private key? This is a particular problem if Claudius has not personally
delivered the public key to the Queen. Even if he did, the private key could be
22 See id.
2 See id.
24 See R. Jason Richards, The Utah Digital Signature Act as "Model" Legislation: A
CriticalAnalysis, 17 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 873, 880-81 (1999).
,. See W. Everett Lupton, Comment, The Digital Signature: Your Identity by the Num-
bers, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, § 11 (1999), available at <http://www.richmond.edu/
jolt/v6i2/note2.html> (describing "hashing" as "the process of creating a string of char-




21 See id. at § 12.
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stolen or lost. A solution to this problem is to rely on a trustworthy third party
to certify that a particular person is associated with a particular public key, and
that that person holds the related private key.29 This third party is generally
known as a Certification Authority ("CA"). If informed by a private key
holder that his or her private key has been lost or stolen, a CA can revoke the
certificate for that key.
30
Public key cryptography is not the only electronic signature technology in
existence today. Companies are racing to develop other types of electronic
signature technology, most prominently biometric technologies based on an
individual's unique physiological or behavioral traits, such as iris scans or
dynamic signature analysis.31 As this technology has been developing, but
before any particular technology has really taken off in the marketplace, a
growing number of jurisdictions have enacted legislation to regulate electronic
signatures.
III. A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES LAWS TO DATE
It took some time for a significant number of jurisdictions to enact
electronic signature legislation. The earliest countries to adopt such
legislation, namely Germany (1997), Italy (1997), Malaysia (1997), and Russia
(1995), endorsed the prescriptive approach mandating specific technology,
namely PKI.32 These countries were strongly influenced by the prescriptive




The prescriptive model is founded on the argument that PKI is the only
mature technology that could provide adequate security to e-commerce
transactions. Proponents of prescriptive legislation contend that legal certainty
is key to stimulating widespread public trust in electronic signatures. 34 Critics,
on the other hand, argue that by giving legal recognition only to one type of
technology, technological improvements may be stymied.
35
29 See Michael J. Osty & Michael J. Pulcanio, The Liability of Certification Authorities
to Relying Third Parties, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO L. 961, 964-65 (1999).
31 See Lupton, supra note 25, at § 18.
31 See, e.g., THE BIoMETRic CONSORTIUM WEB PAGE, available at <http://www.
biometrics.org>.
32 See Amelia H. Boss, The Internet and the Law: Searching for Security in the Law of
Electronic Commerce, 23 NOVA L. REv. 583, 602-03, 606 (1999).
33 See Utah Digital Signature Act of 1995, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (1998
& Supp. 2000).
34 See Boss, supra note 32, at 598.
35 See, e.g., REPORT OF EXPERT GROUP TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA, ELEC-
TRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, Executive Summary (1998),
available at <http://www.law.gov.au/aghome/advisory/eceg/ecegreport.html>.
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Besides its endorsement of PIU technology, another typical attribute of
prescriptive legislation is that it sets out an elaborate legal framework defining
the rights and liabilities of the parties to an electronic transaction, including
trusted third party CAs.36 Critics of the prescriptive approach argue that
prescriptive legislation overly limits the liability of CAs and imposes excessive
liability risk on consumers. 37 Typical prescriptive laws, such as Malaysia's
Digital Signature Act of 1997, provide that if a private key is lost or stolen due
to the key holder's failure to exercise reasonable care, she will bear unlimited
liability for consequential loss or damage.38 The policy reason for this is to
insulate CAs from liability where the CA could not be expected to prevent
such harm or insure against it.
B. The Hybrid Model
As these critics became more vociferous, some jurisdictions, starting with
Singapore in 1998, began to move toward a more market-driven legislative
model. Singapore's Electronic Transactions Act of 1998 was heavily based on
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
Model Law on Electronic Commerce ("MLEC"), adopted in 1996.39 The
UNCITRAL MLEC took a technology-neutral approach n°  This also
influenced other countries adopting legislation around this time such as
Bermuda (1999). 41 The Singaporean law is an example of the "hybrid" or
"two-tier" approach. This hybrid approach was also endorsed by the European
Union Parliament/Council Directive on a Community Framework for
Electronic Signatures ("E.U. Signatures Directive").42 This directive came into
force early in 2000, and must be implemented by Member States by July of
2001.
43
"6 See, e.g., Utah Digital Signature Act of 1995, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-301 to -310
(1998 & Supp. 2000).
"7 See, e.g., C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws in
the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1225, 1233-37 (1997).
- See Digital Signature Act, 1997, § 61 (Malay.), available at <http://vww.cca.
gov/my/sign6l.htm>.
" See Electrone Transactions Act, 1998 (Sing.), available at <http://www.lawnet.
com.sg/freeaccess/ETA.htm>.
See generally UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l
Trade Law, 29th Sess., U.N. Doe. Supplement No. 17 (A/51/17), Annex 1 (1996), available
at <http:llwww.uncitral.org/englishltexts/electcomlml-ec.htm>. See also G.A. Res. 51/162,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/162 (1996) (endorsing UNCITRAL Model
Law).
" See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 40 at Guide to Enactment § I.A.6.
41 See Electronic Transactions Act, 1999 (Berm.), available at <http://legal.06.free.bm>.
42 See European Parliament and Council Directive 1999/93, 2000 O.J. (L 13) 12, avail-
able at <http:llwww.fs.dk/uk/acts/eu/esign-uk.htm>.
43 See id. art. 13, § 1.
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The hybrid approach is founded on a policy of limited technological
neutrality, typically providing, as does the E.U. Signatures Directive, that an
electronic signature may not be denied legal effectiveness or admissibility
solely because it is electronic. 44 However, certain favored technologies are
afforded special presumptions, such as a presumption of authenticity if the
electronic signature is verified by a qualified certificate meeting certain
requirements.45 Although these so-called "advanced electronic signatures" are
not expressly required to be created with a particular technology, the only
existing technology that appears to meet the requirements laid down by hybrid
legislation like the E.U. Signatures Directive, is PKI.
Hybrid legislation typically includes some rules on the rights and duties of
parties to an electronic transaction. For example, the E.U. Signatures Directive
requires Member States to ensure, at minimum, that CAs are liable in damages
for harm caused to someone reasonably relying on a qualified certificate for
the accuracy of the information in it, unless the CA did not act negligently.
46
However, CAs must be permitted to limit their liability by specifying
limitations on the use of a qualified certificate, or the value of a transaction in
which it may be used.47
Proponents of hybrid schemes contend that they are preferable to other
legislative models because they are more flexible and adaptable to new
technological developments, but they also ensure a level of legal certainty that
is necessary to build and maintain sufficient public trust in electronic
signatures.48 But critics of hybrid legislation argue that this approach does not
permit sufficient breathing room for market forces, overprotects certain
technologies at the expense of innovation, and amounts to excessive
government regulation.49
C. Minimalist Legislation
The criticism referred to above influenced the development of the third
legislative model, the "minimalist" approach. This market-worshipping
approach has proved particularly popular in common law jurisdictions. E-Sign
endorses a minimalist approach, 50 as does the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act ("UETA").5' Australia and the United Kingdom have also recently
44 See id. art. 5, § 2.
45 See id. art. 5, § 1.
46 See id. art. 6.
47 See id. art. 6, § 4.
48 See INTERNET LAW & POLICY FORUM, SURVEY OF INT'L ELECTRONIC AND DIGITAL
SIGNATURE INITIATIVES I(B)(2), available at (last modified Sept. 24, 1999) <http://www.ilpf.
org/digsig/survey.htm>.
49 See id.
50 See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000, 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 7001 (Supp. 2001).
51 See generally UNiF. ELEcTRONIC TRANSACTIONs AcT (1999), available at
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enacted minimalist legislation.52  New Zealand is currently considering
pending legislation that is very similar to Australia'S.
53
Minimalist legislation is wholly technology-neutral. For example, E-Sign
provides that no electronic signatures of whatever type may be denied legal
effect, validity, or enforceability simply because it is in electronic form.5 4 No
special presumptions are given to PI, or any other particular technology.
Moreover, no special rights or duties for parties to electronic signature creation
or verification are set out in minimalist legislation.
Proponents of minimalist legislation argue that the market should determine
what technology will succeed. 55 Also, they contend, a minimalist approach
encourages the use of more than just one type of technology. Different
technologies may be preferable for different purposes. But critics contend that
the minimalist approach is hopelessly vague and creates too much legal
uncertainty. They fear that failure to endorse PI may deny it sufficient
support to allow it to thrive.
D. The Explosion of Legislation in 2000
In 2000, there was an explosion of electronic signature legislation in many
parts of the world.5 6 Some of this legislation is prescriptive, such as in India,
Hong Kong, Estonia, and Peru. Some is minimalist, such as Australia,
Gibraltar, and Japan. And some, including much of the European legislation,
is hybrid, including Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia,
and Sweden. The Tower of Babel is clearly still under construction.
IV. CONCLUSION
I close with a few observations on the Tower of Babel of global electronic
signature laws. First, it is extremely important for Americans not to lose sight
of the fact that the minimalist approach we adopted in E-Sign (which was
designed to reconcile our own American Tower of Babel of state electronic
signature laws) has not been universally embraced worldwide. As in the area
of privacy laws, we now find ourselves on something of a collision course with
Europe, as well as some other civil law jurisdictions. Many civil lawyers are
concerned that the American minimalist approach cannot be reconciled with
<http:/www.law.upenn.edulblllulc/ulc.htm>.
12 See Electronic Transactions Act, 1999 § 10 (Austl.), available at <http://law.gov.au/
publications/ecommerce/interim3.html>; Electronic Communications Act, 2000, c. 7, § 7
(Eng.) available at <http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ 20000007.htm>.
,13 See Electronic Transactions Bill, 2000, (N.Z.), Jan. 18, 2001, available at
<http://www.med.govt.nz/irdev/elcom/transactions/bill>.
-4 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7001(a).
5 See, e.g., REPORT OF EXPERT GROUP TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE LEGAL FRAMIEWORK, Executive Summary (1998),
available at <http:llwww.law.gov.au/aghome/advisory/eceg/ecegreport.html>.
-" See generally SIMONE VAN DER HOF, DIGITAL SIGNATURE LAW SURVEY, supra note 3.
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the civil law's approach to contract formalities, which generally includes far
more stringent requirements than in common law jurisdictions.
Sadly, the global initiatives promoting greater harmonization of laws have
really been a case of two little too late. UNClTRAL's Working Group on
Electronic Commerce recently finalized a draft Model Law on Electronic
Signatures ("MLES"), which is expected to be adopted without major change
by the full Commission in June of 2001. 57 But the MLES is not expected to
have much effect on existing legislation. Many business entities lost
confidence in the MLES due to the persistence of its adherence to a
prescriptive approach mandating PKI. Although this approach has finally been
abandoned, it seems unlikely that these business interests will now endorse the
MLES.
Finally, it should be emphasized that too much of the world is simply unin-
volved in the Tower of Babel. To my knowledge, no African country has yet
enacted electronic signature legislation. In the Middle East, only Israel has
electronic signature legislation.58 In my view, it is crucial for global stability
and social justice for the First World to bridge the digital divide and enable the
Third World to participate to a greater extent in e-commerce. If this does not
happen, we will risk becoming a world even more divided between the greedy
haves and the resentful have-nots.
Thank you.
QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION:
MICHAEL MEURER:
Questions? In the back.
QUESTION:
A question for Professor Litman. What are your thoughts about the apparent
disconnect between what you describe as the.., view of the... government
and then all of the polling data of the United States population, which suggests
that a large number of people in the United States would be considered old-
timers who actually would prefer to have legislation that protects their privacy
and that, in addition, they actually do not engage in e-commerce because of the
fear of privacy invasions?
JESSICA LITMAN:
I mean that is, I think, the typical collective action problem. The people
-7 See generally UNCITRAL, Recent documents of UNCITRAL and its Working Groups,
Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Mar. 2001, available at <http:llwww.uncitral.orgl
english/sessions/wg-ec>.
58 See VAN DER HOF, DIGrrAL SIGNATURE LAW SURVEY, supra note 3 (noting that the
Israeli Knesset passed the Electronic Signature Act in March, 2001).
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who influence the government, in crucial respect, are people who make a
business of influencing the government rather than necessarily the aggregate
majorities. And, so, I think that privacy is nothing special along those lines.
AUDIENCE:
Hi, I was hoping to make-
JANE WINN:
The question for those listening on tape was: The American public seems
deeply concerned about information privacy rights even if our government is
disinterested, hence Professor Litman's response, which is this is another
example of breakdown of democratic processes. As a commercial law
professor, those of you who are not commercial law professors would not
know, we are all amateur economic historians and there is an interesting
feature of United States economic history that I think is relevant here. I would
suggest that American consumers have already made a Faustian bargain that
most people are not fully conscious of, that in the United States most
consumers expect to be able to purchase whatever they want, whenever they
want, because they have access to credit; and that's a very significant
characteristic of American markets that is not true once you leave the United
States generally.
Outside the United States, consumers still have savings! Think of that. The
reason that American consumers have access to credit at levels that is
unparalleled anywhere else in the civilized world, is because the institution of
credit reporting grew up in the United States over a hundred years ago. In the
United States, this is an aspect of economic democracy, which is not as
pernicious as some that Professor Litman pointed out-the idea that large
numbers of working people could borrow money and repay it as a self-
amortizing loan out of their current income is a distinctly American economic
institution.' Unsecured lending to consumers on the scale that it exists in the
US is not feasible unless you have information about people's
creditworthiness. The institution of collecting information about consumers is
based on community merchants' associations; and it is only in the last twenty-
five years or so that what were historically community-based credit bureaus
have aggregated into the three big credit reporting services that we know
today. What has happened is that Americans were accustomed to having a
certain amount of information collected about them and retained about them
and reused about them because in the context it was favorable. There was a
quid pro quo that was favorable. And the institutional transformation has
changed all those calculations.
So, you know, when they do these surveys and they say, like, "How do you
feel about having, you know, corporations collect all this information about
For a history of consumer credit in the US, see Lendol Calder, Financing the American
Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit (1999).
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you and sell it?" and everyone says, like, "Oh, that's really horrible." But if
you ask, "Do you feel so strongly about your privacy rights that you would be
willing to pay cash for your purchases?" At that point, we have got something
to negotiate because US consumers really are willing to give up some privacy
if they get something in return, such as for better terms or credit. This is a big
cultural difference between the US and Europe, where there is less dependence
on consumer credit. The decision in Europe to have categorical information
privacy rights is politically feasible because merchants in European countries
do not have the institutions that we do of collecting information about
consumers for credit and marketing purposes, so they are not giving anything
up by recognizing strong privacy rights. Perhaps European merchants are
starting to adopt U.S.-style marketing practices, but in general, they do not
have them today. There is not somebody whose ox is being gored. In Europe
they can pass strong privacy laws because the lobbyists are not resisting as
forcefully as they are in the United States.
MICHAEL MEURER:
Can you pass that down, please? We have got a great question here and
three answers from our panelists.
ELLIOT MAXWELL:
I do not believe that the United States government has been indifferent to
this question of privacy. The Administration over the last four years has
vigorously supported privacy legislation, with respect to financial services and
with respect to medical privacy. It has strongly advocated a position that
unless there were wide and deep implementation of the OECD principles on
privacy that it might support legislation; and, in fact, the FTC has supported
legislation. If one looks at the pattern of behavior within the e-commerce
community over the last three years, there have been very positive changes in
behavior with regard to privacy. And, so, to describe the government as
indifferent seems to me dead wrong.
Now, the question is whether a system of privacy legislation akin to the
European Privacy Directive is either desirable or, if desirable, politically
feasible, is a different question. But the characterization of indifference is
absolutely inappropriate I think we can debate the best way to implement the
principles of notice, choice, redress, security, and the like. So, I would much
rather engage on those issues rather than whether the government is
indifferent.
JESSICA LITMAN:
I did not say indifferent to privacy, I said uninterested in regulating this;
and-
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ELLIOT MAXIWELL:
If one reads the thousands and thousands of pages of comments on medical
privacy, for example, and one looks at the progress of those rules, I do not
think it would be fair to say that the government has not been interested in
regulations that enhance privacy protection. The Administration has taken the
position that certain kinds of information are more sensitive than others and
should be treated differently. It has looked to a range of actions, including
self-regulation, regulation and laws, as well as technological solutions and
increased education.
MICHAEL MEURER:








One question or two reactions.
QUESTION:
Joel Reidenberg with Fordham University. I guess it is a reaction. I would
agree with Elliot that the United States government has not been indifferent. I
think it is a gross overstatement to say that the United States government has
pushed any kind of reasonable level of fair information practice regulation in
the United States. We can look, yes, there have been a couple of successes,
like the HIPA regulations that have come out in the last couple of days, but if
you look at areas like financial services privacy, I mean, in particular, Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, as a fair information practices statute, it is mediocre at best. I
think Jane's example of credit reporting is a particularly apt one because that is
the one area in American law where we in fact have a very powerful privacy
statute called the Fair Credit Reporting Act. If you look back to 1970 when it
was enacted, the growth of the consumer credit industry in the United States
has been attributed to the fact that we have had strong privacy protection in
that field. I certainly do not see that anywhere that has come out.
ELLIOT MAXWELL:
I just want to note that the Administration did not support the final version
B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L[
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and, in fact, worked actively to try to strengthen it.
And so to characterize that legislation as one the Administration supported
when the Administration at the time of passage said that it would seek
introduction of new legislation in the following Congress because of its lack of
satisfaction with the protections in that legislation is hardly a fair
characterization of the Administration's position.
JESSICA LITMAN:
Again, Elliot, I did not mean to impugn your Administration or the
Commerce Department or President Clinton when I talked about the
government writ large.
MICHAEL MEURER:
Thirty seconds. Thirty seconds, please.
ELLIOT MAXWELL:
There has been, and will continue to be, a very important debate about
privacy in the Administration and in the Congress. I am very comfortable in
saying that the Clinton-Gore Administration was not satisfied with Gramm-
Leach-Bliley and has not been satisfied with how deeply and broadly the
OECD principles have been adopted. I think we all have lots of hard work to
do in getting better privacy protection and in determining the appropriate
means to accomplish that.
MICHAEL MEURER:
Okay, I am sorry. We are going to have to cut this off and move to the
business meeting. That ends the e-commerce section. Thanks very much to
the panelists.
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